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Abstract: This work focuses on the study of the relationship between ownership and 
control structure of the company and its innovative activity. Its aim consists of 
analysing the role that may be played by determinants within the company related to 
ownership structure when the decision to incur research and development activities is 
taken as well as on the output of this innovative process. Among these determinants we 
may think of issues such as who owns the firm and how the control of decision-making 
is distributed, the nature of this control and the level of concentration of ownership, 
among others. The study is carried out for the year 2001 using a representative sample 
of Spanish manufacturing industries. 
 
Keywords: ownership and control structure, research and development, agency theory. 
JEL classifications: D210, O310, G320. 
 
Resumen: Este trabajo se centra en el estudio de la relación entre la estructura de 
propiedad y control de la empresa y la actividad innovadora de la misma. Se pretende 
analizar el papel que pueden desempeñar ciertos determinantes internos a la empresa 
relacionados con la estructura de propiedad tanto en la decisión de incurrir en gastos de 
I+D como en el resultado innovador obtenido por la empresa. Del análisis realizado se 
podrán extraer conclusiones sobre el efecto que ciertos mecanismos adoptados para 
paliar los problemas de agencia surgidos por la no identidad entre propiedad y control 
en puestos de toma de decisiones tienen en la gestión de actividades innovadoras en la 
empresa. El estudio se realiza para el año 2001 tomando una muestra representativa de 
las industrias manufactureras españolas.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, companies have become aware of their need to encourage their 
capacity for innovation. This has reached the point where it has come to be understood 
as a continuous process that is not formulated in order to attain a specific objective, but 
instead one that is included in the company's strategy, becoming institutional. 
Companies feel that they are safer from possible competition by formalising their own 
innovations in the patents and trademarks register. All types of activities are involved in 
obtaining this objective - scientific, technological, organisational, financial and 
commercial. 
There is a great deal of recent literature which studies the determinants in 
innovation. These studies may be categorised as macroeconomic, which try to explain 
the potentialities in various geographical units in the field of innovation, and 
microeconomic studies, which analyse the internal determinants within the company to 
explain innovative efforts and results. Some questions such as the effect of the 
company’s size, its age, its degree of co-operation with other companies or financing, 
both internal and external, have been analysed in detail in the microeconomic studies. 
However, there have been few studies which have tried to explain the effect of variables 
such as the decision-making structure or ownership on the decisions to invest in the 
company. 
A company's ability to innovate depends on a series of factors, in such a way that 
whether or not they are present has a favourable or unfavourable influence on the 
innovation process. These factors may be placed in the following groups: 
1. The existence of favourable conditions in the demand structure or in the market 
size, in the life cycle of the products it manufactures, or in the evolution of 
scientific and technical means that it may use. 
2. The resources that the company allocates to engineering, design, research and 
marketing. 
Moreover, the favourable conditions mentioned above and the company's technical 
capacity must be integrated in the framework of an innovative strategy, and then the 
following factors become involved: 
3. The company's management and organisation. 
4. Its desire to differentiate its products or processes from those of its competitors. 
Considering the possible significance of the company’s management and organisation 
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with regard to its innovative activity, the third point above, we feel that there is a need 
to analyse the characteristics of the ownership structure of the company - who owns it 
and how the control of decision-making is distributed, the nature of this control, the 
percentage of its capital owned by managers1 and the level of concentration of 
ownership, among other issues. The characteristics that may lead to good management 
of the company's resources, both financial and physical, are innumerable. This will be 
determinant in the achievement of good results in the company's innovative process, 
which will determine its growth and its future. 
While there are many studies that contain models analysing the determinants of 
companies in the decision to invest in R&D (Geroski and Pomroy, 1990; Busom, 1993; 
Gumbau, 1994, 1997; Crépon et al., 1996; Love et al., 1996; Dixon and Seddighi, 1996; 
Galende and Suárez, 1996; Beneito, 2003, among others), there are very few that 
include any type of ownership structure variable in their study. Some works analyse 
what the determinants are in the creation of the company's value, introducing variables 
which include the structure of capital and control of the company into their analysis 
(Jensen, 1986; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Hermanlin and Weisbach, 1991; and Kole, 
1995; among others), but in most cases they do not analyse the process of innovation, 
due to a lack of information. 
Thus, our work focuses on the study of the relationship between company 
ownership and control structure and the R&D input and output. Its aim, based on the 
literature both in the field of ownership structure and in the field of innovation, is to 
analyse the role that may be played by internal determinants in the company related to 
its ownership and control structure on the innovative activity of the company.  
The article is structured in five parts. After the short introduction, which we have 
used as a guide to identify the determinants to be considered in our study, and the 
presentation of our objective, we briefly summarise the empirical literature in the field 
of the impact of ownership structure in company’s results. The third section describes 
the characteristics of the sample and the methodology followed. In the same section, all 
the variables considered in our analyses are discussed. The fourth section shows the 
results obtained in the empirical research. Finally, the main conclusions drawn from our 
analysis are presented. 
 
                                                 
1 In this study, we will use the terms “manager” and “director” indiscriminately to designate workers in decision-making 
positions. 
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2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND 
INNOVATION. WORKING HYPOTHESIS. 
 
In order to draw conclusions regarding the role of organisational strategy in business 
decisions in general, and in investment decisions in particular, it is necessary to consider 
the literature concerning capital structure in depth. The literature analysing the subject 
of ownership and control has provided interesting articles with the objective of studying 
how companies’ capital and financial structure determines their opportunities for 
growth. These have tried to explain companies’ results taking the structure of the 
company's share capital, the concentration of ownership and the type of main investor 
as explanatory variables. 
Among the works analysing the relationship between capital structure and 
opportunities for growth are those by Smith and Watts (1992) and Lasfer (1995). The 
first analyses how financing decisions, on the one hand, and management remuneration 
policy, on the other, may influence the company's investments and opportunities for 
growth, with a negative relationship obtained between opportunities for growth and 
debt, something which provides the opportunity to regulate the agency conflicts 
affecting them. Lasfer's work confirms the positive influence of "leverage"2 on those 
cases in which the company does not have valuable opportunities for growth, as 
proposed by Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990). Himmelberg et al. (1999) also analyses the 
determinants of company value by applying panel data, arguing that the heterogeneity 
that is not observed generates a spurious correlation between ownership and 
opportunities for growth. 
By carrying out a short review of the literature which relates Tobin's Q ratio3 with 
the "managerial ownership"4 variable, it can be seen that the creation of value has no 
relationship of a lineal nature with ownership, as the value of the company increases 
and decreases for various proportions of ownership in the hands of its directors. Among 
the studies analysing this area are several that obtain an inverted U-shaped relationship 
(McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Mørck et al., 1988; Holderness et al., 1999). The study 
by Kole (1995) examines the differences in the works mentioned above and concludes 
                                                 
2 “Leverage” is understood to be the effect that occurs on risk and the level of variability in a company’s results due to 
the effect of having increased external financing. 
3 Tobin’s Q ratio is a proxy valuable in the creation of value. One of the most often used ratios is the quotient between 
the value of shares and the sum of the company’s debt in the financial market and the cost of repositioning its real 
assets. 
4 We understand “managerial ownership” to be an aspect showing the percentage of shares or ownership in the hands 
of managers or directors. 
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that differences in business size may lead to differences in the conclusions drawn by 
this type of work. Moreover, they do not take into account the problem of endogeneity 
involved in the use of the variable "managerial ownership" as an explanatory variable, 
as noted by Jensen and Warner (1988). 
Leech and Leahy (1991) carry out a study using data from British companies, with 
the aim of describing the ownership structure of a sample of large companies and 
carrying out an econometric analysis of its causes and consequences in terms of control 
and incentives. They feel that the ownership structure and its level of concentration have 
an important role in the growth of the company. Using the regression model including 
variables related to the utility functions of the directors, shareholders and owners, they 
conclude that the company's opportunity for growth depends on the concentration of 
ownership and the directors' control. 
In Spain, Galve and Salas (1993) carried out an empirical study with the aim of 
analysing the shareholding composition of Spanish companies and to check whether 
there were differences in the financial results that were attributable to the type of the 
owner group controlling the company. They gave details of the mechanism by which 
the ownership-control influences results, with a positive relation shown between 
concentration of ownership and the results obtained by the company, as well as family 
ownership type. In the work by Andrés et al. (2000), which aimed to study the impact of 
the decision to become indebted and contractual structure on the market value of 
companies, the conclusion is drawn that concentration of ownership is a harmful 
influence in the presence of opportunities for growth. A positive relationship between 
directors' shareholdings and the creation of value in the absence of opportunities is not 
proved.  
Literature concerning ownership structure and its effect on the growth of companies 
has been analysed up to this point. However, as far as we know, there are hardly any 
works concerning the role that may be played by a company's ownership structure and 
the way in which it is constituted and administered on decisions as important as the 
innovative strategy to be adopted. Some aspects related to ownership structure, among 
other questions, are only analysed in the works by Love et al. (1996), Dixon and 
Seddighi (1996), Acs and Isberg (1991) and Francis and Smith (1995). In the first of 
these, a sample of Scottish companies is analysed, with the conclusion that foreign 
ownership has a positive effect on the probability of a company located in Scotland 
obtaining product innovations. In the work by Dixon and Seddighi, carried out with a 
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sample of English companies, the effect of the type of ownership (domestic or foreign) 
is analysed. In this work, as well as that by Acs and Isberg, it is independent of the 
innovation carried out by the company. Finally, the work by Francis and Smith, 
examines the empirical relation between corporate ownership structure and innovation. 
They test the hypothesis that diffusely-held firms are less innovative than firms with 
either a high concentration of management ownership or a significant equity block held 
by an outside investor. Their results are consistent with the conjecture that concentrated 
ownership and shareholder monitoring are effective at alleviating the high agency and 
contracting costs associated with innovation.  
For the Spanish case Galende and De la Fuente (1999) have developed an 
econometric analysis to a sample of Spanish innovative companies. Investigating the 
determinant factors in the organisation of a firm’s innovative activities, their empirical 
findings confirm the existence of interesting relations between internal factors and the 
innovative process. The significant effect of the financing mechanism (the use of debt) 
indicates that high financial debt in the company has an impact in the sense that more 
incremental innovations are generated than radical ones. 
Taking into account the previous literature, we have some a priori ideas on which 
can be the impact of some variables reflecting the ownership and control structure of 
firms on their R&D activity. With regards to the level of concentration of the firm’s 
ownership, we expect that the diffusely-held companies will have more probability to 
undertake R&D costs because of the major mobility of actions of their managers. On the 
other hand, the incorporation of owners into the firm decisions acts as a direct control of 
the manager decisions so we expect that due to the lack of specialisation, their effect on 
the R&D activities will be negative. Finally, despite of the ambiguity of the debt 
mechanism on the firm investment explained in the literature, we consider that the 
empirical evidence that points to the negative influence of debt financing on innovation 
activities should be taken into account.    
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
3.1. METHODOLOGY 
 
Our objective is to analyse the impact of several aspects related to ownership 
structure and management/control of the company on the decision to innovate, the 
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innovative effort and the innovative output, so that the treatment of the data will be 
different in each case. We will need therefore to develop different models to measure 
each of these aspects. 
 
3.1.1. The decision to undertake R&D expenses 
 
Our first model will be focussed on the yes/no decision to carry out R&D expenses, 
so that we estimate a logistic cross-sectional model5 which relates internal and external 
structure of the firm and innovation. 
As a result, given the binary nature of the endogenous variable for analysis, the 
decision whether or not to invest in innovation, specifying a discreet choice model is 
considered appropriate, selecting the logistic model estimated using the maximum 
likelihood method. Due to the fact that in this type of model the first order conditions 
are not lineal, the estimated parameters are obtained using iterative procedures. While 
the parameters are not easy to interpret, their sign shows us the direction of the effect 
caused by the explanatory variables on the endogenous variable6. In this type of model, 
the quotients between the estimated values of two parameters measure the relative 
importance of the effects that the explanatory variables associated with these parameters 
have on the probability of selecting the Yi=1 alternative. Because of this property, while 
the coefficients of a logit model are not directly interpretable, their relative values are. 
The logistic model can be rewritten in terms of the odds that a particular event will 
occur. The odds are the ratio between the probability that an event will happen (in this 
case, that the firm will carry out R&D expenses over the year) and the probability that it 
will not happen. Thus, Exp (βi) is the incremental odds ratio corresponding to an 
increase of one unit in an independent variable, assuming that the values of all other 
variables remain unchanged. If the value is greater than one the odds increase, and if the 
value is less than one they decrease.  
 
Taking into account the hypothesis that we aim to test, the model we will estimate 
follows the next expression: 
                                                 
5 Like several authors Busom, 1993; Gumbau, 1994; Dixon and Seddighi, 1996; Gumbau, 1997; Galende and Suárez, 
1999; Beneito, 2003 
6 For a more detailed explanation of the logit model, see Econometrics manuals such as the one by Greene (2003). 
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+β+β+β+β
+β+β+β+β+β+β+β=
(Model 1) 
As a dependent variable, the innovation input variable INNOV is a dichotomous 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the company has incurred some R&D expense over 
the year, and a null value if not. 
Considering the objectives stated in the previous section and the ideas expressed in 
the second section in order to analyse the impact that the various ownership structure 
and control of the company variables may have on the company's innovative activity, 
our study includes the following variables.  
The variable OWN is the percentage of owners or family members in management 
positions in the company's total staff as of 31st December in the year analysed. The 
variable explains the application of the incorporation of owners into decisions posts in 
the firm to alleviate the ownership and management separation of functions. This 
separation of functions implies a series of advantages, mainly of specialisation, which 
businesses cannot ignore. In their study in 1976, Jensen and Meckling noted that there 
was a problem of free-riding, according to which given the information that investors 
have on the company's activities is usually limited or not precise, they may have the 
incentive to involve the company in growth rates above optimal levels instead of trying 
to maximise its market value. When directors are the people controlling this type of 
resource, there is the risk of an unproductive or inappropriate use of resources. The 
solution to this type of conflict may involve providing managers with the incentive to 
distribute these resources as against investing them in projects with a negative net 
current value. To ensure this type of conduct, the management team has two basic tools 
at its disposition. Firstly, an increase in financing in the form of debt, which obliges the 
manager to release the free resources that the company has generated. Secondly, greater 
control by investors by means of a concentration of ownership (an instrument used in 
Spanish industry, as we will see) which acts as a supervision mechanism for the poor 
use that management may make of these resources. In this latter case, managers' 
shareholding in the company may also contribute to putting a stop to sub-optimal 
investment policies. 
The variable DEBT, includes the percentage of external financing compared to the 
total financing. Some authors argue that financing with debt has an ambiguous effect as 
a mechanism for mitigating agency problems (Hall, 1992; Chiao, 2002). From a 
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theoretical point of view, transaction cost theory and the agency theory argue that debt 
financing can discourage innovative activities. The first one analyses the high 
specificity and intangibility of technological investments. This increases transaction 
costs and seems to dissuade debt financing. The second theory shows the high risk of 
these activities and the existing information asymmetries, which cause problems with 
debt financing (in Galende and De la Fuente, 2003). An increase in the level of 
indebtedness may lead to increased conflict between shareholders and bondholders. 
However, this increase may mitigate the divergences of interests between internal and 
external shareholders and management, as well as providing valuable information 
regarding business perspectives. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that financing in the 
form of debt leads to the adoption of investment projects with excessive risk. According 
to them, the contribution made by shareholders to the company has limited 
responsibility, so that shareholders prefer management to adopt risky investment 
projects which offer the opportunity to obtain higher profits and in which the increased 
probability of loss only affects the holder of the debt. However, the latter prefer less 
risky project enabling surer recovery of the value of their contribution.  
The variable SHARE includes information regarding the level of concentration of 
ownership, showing the percentage of the company's share capital that is in the hands of 
the main shareholder. This higher concentration may be acting as a mechanism to 
relieve agency problems arising from the lack of identity between ownership and 
control. The direct control of the shareholders to the management can reduce the risky 
investments of the firm. This mechanism has a range of associated disadvantages, 
related to the increased risk borne by the owners, less liquidity in markets and fewer 
opportunities for negotiation of the company’s values. 
Finally, we include also the variable dichotomous variable STOCK, which takes the 
value of the unit when the company is quoted on the Stock Exchange, and a null value 
when it is not.  
Furthermore, a range of variables regarding the company's internal structure is 
considered to check the effect that its general characteristics may have on its innovation. 
These aspects have been widely analysed in the literature. Problems of bias are thereby 
avoided in the coefficients of the variables related to the company's ownership structure, 
which are the main focus of this study. 
As far as the company's internal structure variables are concerned, the variable 
SIZE, a variable showing the size of the business, includes the total personnel numbers 
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as of 31st December. The variable AGE, the variable showing the company’s age or 
maturity, shows how many years have passed since the company was founded. With 
regard to the size variable, the study by Schumpeter (1942) suggested the influence of 
size on this type of analysis. There are theoretical works which argue that larger 
companies have potentialities such as obtaining economies of scale, decreased risk, a 
larger market and greater opportunities for appropriation (Fernández, 1996). Despite the 
unanimity of the theoretical works, from the empirical point of view there is a great deal 
of disparity in results. There are both studies with a positive result in the relationship 
between size and innovation (Scherer, 1992; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Love et al., 1990; 
Cohen and Kleeper, 1996; among others), and others that have not been able to confirm 
this positive influence of size (Mansfield, 1964; Acs and Audretsch, 1991; among 
others). The age variable has also been one of the determinants most checked by the 
literature. The age of the firm is a possible measure of its organisational resources. It 
represents the experience and knowledge accumulated throughout its history and is 
related to a better management of communication and of necessary creativity to 
innovate, and to a more effective capacity of absorption (Galende and De la Fuente, 
2003). It is a variable commonly used to measure the experience and the learning of the 
firms, factors that are organisational resources. 
Concerning the information regarding its business sector we have classified the 
firms into different categories depending on the technological opportunity of their 
sector. The technological opportunity is considered to be determined by characteristics 
of the specific industrial sector to which a particular firm belongs. This kind of variables 
may be capturing various technology dimensions such as technological opportunity, 
appropriability regimes, dynamic aspects as cumulativeness or the emergence of 
dominant designs along the technology life cycle, the necessity for complementary and 
specialized assets, when implementing innovations. Following Lafuente et al. (1985), 
the industrial sectors of the ESEE can be classified as sectors of high, medium and low 
technological opportunities7. In order to avoid perfect multicollinearity we have 
eliminated the medium category. Therefore, the variable HIGH is a dichotomous 
variable which takes the value of the unit when the company belongs to a high 
                                                 
7 The following have been classified as high technological opportunity sectors: office machinery, computer, processing, 
optical and similar equipment; chemical products; machinery and mechanical equipment; electrical and electronic 
machinery and material; motors and autos; other transport material, publishing and graphic arts. As medium 
technological opportunity sectors: the meat industry; food and tobacco products; beverages; rubber and plastics; non-
metallic mineral products; Metallurgy; metal products. And as low technological opportunity sectors: Textiles and 
clothing, leather and footwear, wood; Paper; Furniture and other manufacturing industries. 
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technological opportunity sector of activity, and a null value when it is not and the 
variable LOW is a dichotomous variable which takes the value of the unit when the 
company belongs to a low technological opportunity sector of activity, and a null value 
when it is not. We expect that the companies belonging to high opportunity sectors have 
a more important R&D activity than the companies from low opportunity sectors. 
In order to include the effect of the structure of the market in which the company 
works, the variable MARKET has been included, which provides information regarding 
the geographical extent of the main market. It is a dichotomous variable that classifies 
companies according to whether their market is higher or equal to national extent and 
takes the null value when it is lower than national geographical extent. This variable 
shows the effect that the company deciding to expand its market to a wider geographical 
extent may have on R&D activities. This variable also explains the effect of demand on 
the R&D company decisions and the different kinds of competition whether the 
geographical extent is higher than national or not. The empirical literature shows a 
positive relationship between exports and R&D and innovation investments.   
Finally, concerning the region where the company is situated, we have constructed the 
variable REG. The ESEE is not representative at a regional geographical extent, so we 
constructed the variable REG with the macroeconomic information of The National Statistical 
Institute (INE). The dichotomous variable REG classifies firms into two categories, firms that are 
situated in a region with higher technological opportunities than the medium of Spanish regions 
take the value one, and a null value when their region has a low value of R&D effort with 
respect to the medium value of the total amount of regions8. We expect that the firms situated in 
a region with high technological opportunities have more possibilities to undertake R&D 
expenses and to obtain R&D output. 
 
3.1.2. The R&D effort. 
 
The second model explains the R&D effort per employee, which is measured as the 
R&D expenses per employee. Due to the fact that the dependent variable is a continuous 
and truncated variable we choose the Tobit model based on the following function: 
[ ]2iii ,0N,x'y σ≈εε+β=  
The most familiar case of this model, which is typical for expenditures, is the case in 
which the observed data contain a cluster of zeros, and the observed dependent variable 
is described with the following structure: 
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                   0   when  yi* ≤ 0 
    yi*   
                   yi*  when  yi* > 0 
Taking into account the hypothesis that we want to analyse, we develop the 
following tobit model, which has as a dependent continuous variable the innovation 
input variable EFFORT, a variable showing the R&D expense per employee over the 
year: 
ii11i10i9i8i7
i6i5i4i3i2i10i
uMARKETREGLOWHIGH
DEBTSHARESTOCKOWNAGESIZEEFFORT
+λβ+β+β+β+β
+β+β+β+β+β+β+β=
(Model 2) 
Following the work of other authors that use the Tobit model to analyse the R&D 
expenses of the firm (Cohen, Levin and Mowery, 1987; Cohen and Klepper, 1996; 
González and Jaumandreu, 1998; Beneito, 2003), we will include the inverse Mills ratio 
(λi) computed from the previous estimation of the discrete choice model with the aim to 
control the selection bias. The signification of this parameter explains the importance of 
the selection bias and the necessity to control the different characteristics of the two 
groups of firms, the firms that undertake R&D expenses over the year and the firms that 
do not by means of the discrete choice methods. 
 
3.1.3. The probability to obtain an R&D output 
 
We develop different models to explain the effect of several aspects internal to the 
firm on the R&D output. In a first step we estimate a model that explains the 
determinants of the probability to award R&D output (model 3). There are authors that 
develop a discrete choice model to measure the effect of different variable on the 
probability of awarding patents or other R&D result (Love et al., 1996; Coronado and 
Acosta, 1999). 
As a result, given the binary nature of the endogenous variable and the hypothesis 
that we want to estimate, we develop the following logistic model: 
i109876
543210i
uMARKETREGLOWHIGHDEBT
SHARESTOCKOWNAGEEFFORTRESULT
+β+β+β+β+β
+β+β+β+β+β+β=
 
(Model 3) 
 
                                                                                                                                               
8 The high technological regions, which take the unit value, are Catalonia, Madrid, Navarre and the Basque Country.  
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The model has as a dependent variable, the dichotomous variable RESULT, that 
takes the unit value when the firm award national or foreigner patents and/or models of 
use, and the null value otherwise. The set of explanatory variables are the same as the 
ones used in the previous models. 
 
3.1.4. The innovative result 
 
Finally, the fourth model is focussed on the analysis of the R&D output based on the 
Griliches’ work. The Knowledge Production Function framework was originally 
developed by Griliches (Griliches 1979, 1986) and is conceptualised as a Cobb-
Douglas-type function that includes several factors of knowledge production such as the 
R&D expenditures carried out by the firm (Pakes and Griliches, 1984; Hausman, Hall 
and Griliches, 1984; Acs and Audretsch, 1988; Crépon and Duguet, 1997; Blundell, 
Griffith and Van Reenen, 1995).  
Specifically, the basic model we consider relates the innovative output in a firm, 
measured through the number of patents and models of use, to research and 
development inputs in the same firm through a knowledge production function. We 
slightly modify this production function so that the increment of the innovative output 
depends upon a number of further factors related to the internal characteristics of the 
firms among which some issues related to ownership structure are included.  
In order to assess the impact of these determinants on the number of patents and 
models of use awarded by the firm, the discreteness of the latter variable has to be taken 
into account. For instance, because of difficulties and uncertainty inherent to R&D 
activities, firms do not always apply for patents and hence a zero value is a natural 
outcome of this variable. Because of this property, the use of conventional linear 
regression models may be inappropriate. The reasons are that some basic assumptions 
such as the normality of residuals or the linear adjustment of data are no longer fulfilled. 
The usual way to deal with the discrete non-negative nature of the patent dependent 
variable is to consider a count data model. (in Cincera, 1997) 
One of the most common count data model is the Poisson regression model, the 
number of events, given a set of regressors X, has a Poisson distribution with density 
function:  
 12
    ( ) ,...2,1,0y,
!y
e
xyf i
i
y
i
ii
i =µ=
µ−
 
The conditional mean depends on the individual characteristics reflected in the 
regressors, in others words: 
( ) ( )β=Ε=µ iiii xexpxy  
The likelihood function, given the independence of the observations, is: 
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And the logarithmic likelihood function is: 
( ) ( )[ ]∑
=
−β−β=β
N
1y
iiii !ylnxexpxyX,yLln  
The estimators of the Poisson model would be given by the solution of the first 
order conditions: 
( )[ ]∑
=
=β−
N
1i
iii 0xxexpy  
The standard procedure for computing the estimators is the Newton-Raphson 
iterative method. Convergence is ensured because the logarithmic likelihood function is 
globally concave. 
The application of the Poisson model requires equality of means and variance, a 
requirement that cannot always be met in practice. If the data show overdispersion, the 
standard errors of the Poisson model will be biased to the low end, giving spurious high 
values for the t statistics (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986, 1990). The most common 
formulation for taking into account the overdispersion of data is the negative binomial 
model. This assumes that the variance is a quadratic function of the mean. We also 
incorporated like other authors (Coronado and Acosta, 2003) the estimation of the 
negative binomial model for a more comprehensive evaluation of the hypothesis. 
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3.2. DATABASE9
 
The database used is the Survey of Entrepreneurial Strategies (Encuesta sobre 
Estrategias Empresariales, henceforth ESEE) produced by the “Public Enterprise 
Foundation” of Spain for what is today the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(previously the Ministry of Industry and Energy). The Public Enterprise Foundation's 
Economic Research Programme designed the survey, supervises its annual production 
and maintains the database. The ESEE is a statistical research project that surveys a 
panel of companies representing manufacturing industries in Spain on an annual basis. 
Its design is relatively flexible and it is suitable for two types of potential use. On the 
one hand, it provides in-depth knowledge and analysis of the industrial sector's 
evolution over time by means of multiple data concerning the business and decisions of 
companies in the sector. The ESEE is also designed to generate micro-economic 
information that enables econometric models to be specified and tested. 
As far as its coverage is concerned, the reference population of the ESEE is 
companies with 10 or more workers in what is usually known as manufacturing 
industry. The geographical area of reference is Spain, and the variables have a timescale 
of one year. One of the most outstanding characteristics of the ESEE is its 
representativeness. The initial selection of companies took place by combining 
thoroughness criteria and a random sample. Companies with more than 200 workers 
were included in the first group, which were requested to participate thoroughly. 
Companies with less than 200 employees formed the second group, which was selected 
by stratification sampling, proportional with restrictions and systematic with a random 
start-up. This is a random sample of the crosses of the 21 CNAE manufacturing 
activities to two digits and for employment intervals: 2-10, 21-50, 51-100 and 100-200 
workers.  
As Beneito (2003) points out, the possibility offered by the ESEE of considering not 
only patents, but also models of use, is particularly important in a sample where the 
number of SMEs, as we will see later, is considerable. A great portion of innovations in 
SMEs are incremental innovations and thus are not susceptible to be reflected in 
patents. The consideration of models of use, as long as they are means of protecting 
incremental innovations, may come to compensate for this flaw of the patents measure. 
                                                 
9 For more information concerning the database, see Fariñas and Huergo (1999), Fariñas and Jaumandreu (1994, 
1999). 
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Since the variables have already been presented, in order to place the information 
within the framework that we are going to use in our study we considered it useful to 
give a descriptive analysis regarding the variables that will be used in the year under 
consideration (Tables 1, 2 and 3). 
Table 1 shows some statistics describing the quantitative variables in the study for 
the year 2001. It can be seen that the average concentration of capital in the hands of the 
main shareholder (SHARE) has a high mean close to 100 per cent. It is worth to 
emphasize that the median is 100 per cent. It can be concluded that there are a high 
number of companies that decide to use the concentration of the capital as a possible 
control mechanism in the face of agency problems between ownership and control. As 
regards the variable OWN, the variable which considers the rate of owners in 
management positions in the company’s total staff has a low mean and a null value. 
Finally, the variable DEBT, which includes the percentage of external financing 
compared to the total financing, seems to present a high mean and a higher medium to 
respect the others. The higher debt ratio in Europe have been noted by various authors 
(Prowse, 1990; Bhagat and Welch, 1995). Some of the causes can perhaps be attributed 
to the less severe conflicts of interest between the stockholders and bondholders in this 
European countries (France, Germany and Holland), compared to the US. The 
ownership and governance structures perhaps help mitigate stockholder-bondholder 
conflicts of interest.  
 As far as the average SIZE and AGE of the companies considered is concerned, 
these are medium-sized companies (with an average of 240 workers), which have been 
stable with the passing of time, and which have an average age of 24 years. With respect 
the R&D input and output (EFFORT and PAT), the percentages of the median are null 
in the two cases.  
As far as variables of a qualitative nature are concerned, as a prior analysis to the 
estimation of the model, tables 2 and 3 are added, which show the percentages of 
companies that state they have invested in R&D in each category and have awarded 
patents and/or models of use in the current year. The results clearly show on a general 
scale that companies that do invest in R&D and have an innovative output are a small 
percentage of the total number of companies.  
With regard to the variable which tells us whether or not the company is quoted on 
the Stock Exchange (STOCK), it is significant that practically all the companies quoted 
on the Stock Exchange invest in innovation. Moreover, companies quoted on the Stock 
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Exchange have a higher percentage of awarding some R&D output than the companies 
that do not quoted on the Stock Exchange.   
As anticipated, for the technological opportunity variables, the category showing the 
highest percentage of investment in R&D and innovative output (national, foreigner 
patents and models of use) is the category "high technological opportunity" (HIGH), 
with half the companies in this category having R&D costs. The analysis for the 
geographical extent of the main market (MARKET), it can be seen that if the extent of 
the geographical market is higher or equal to the national level, the percentage of 
companies making an investment in innovation is more important. The same conclusion 
is obtained in relation to the innovative output, since the companies with their 
geographical extent of the main market higher or equal to national level have more 
patents and models of use than the companies with lower markets. Finally, the table 
shows the influence of the situation of the firm in a region with high technological 
opportunities (REG), showing approximately half the companies in this category having 
R&D expenses and also awarding R&D output. 
Finally, Table 4 shows the correlation matrix between the variables considered in 
our model for the year analysed, with the lack of problems of high collinearity between 
them clearly visible. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1. The decision to undertake R&D expenses 
 
Table 5 shows the results from the estimation of the logistical model, which explains 
the determinants in the decision to incur R&D costs for the year 2001. The main factor 
is the important explanatory role of the variables of ownership structure and control 
type in companies' innovative activity. 
All the variables that we have defined as variables in the company's internal 
structure are significant10 for the current year. As was to be expected, both size (SIZE) 
and age (AGE) presented a positive parameter, leading to the conclusion that the bigger 
and older the company is, the more likely it is to incur R&D costs. Many authors obtain 
these results. With regard to the size variable, our results show the influence pointed by 
                                                 
10 The significance is tested with the use of the Wald statistic, which allow us to check the null hypothesis that each 
coefficient is 0. 
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Schumpeter (1942), and some others studies with a positive result in the relationship 
between size and innovation (Scherer, 1992; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Love et al., 1990; 
Cohen and Kleeper, 1996; among others). For the case of Spain, there are many studies 
that have aimed to confirm the effect of the size variable on innovation (Busom, 1993; 
Labeaga and Martinez-Ros, 1994; Gumbau, 1994, 1997; Molero and Buesa, 1996; 
Fariñas and Huergo, 1999; Beneito, 2002, 2003; among others) which have reached the 
same conclusion as Schumpeter, especially in the industrial sector. The age variable 
(AGE) has also been one of the most checked determinants by the literature, with the 
conclusion drawn by us reached on most occasions. It is a variable commonly used to 
measure the experience and the learning of the firms, factors that are organisational 
resources and the experience and knowledge accumulated. There are some authors who 
verify a positive impact of age on innovative activity for the Spanish case (Busom, 
1993; Molero and Buesa, 1993; Gumbau, 1997, and others). However, there exists a 
work by Molero and Buesa (1996) which shows that young companies dedicated more 
resources to innovation. 
As far as the variables of ownership structure and control are concerned, the variable 
showing identity between ownership and control (OWN) tells us that the greater the 
percentage of owners or relatives in management positions with regard to the total 
number of employees, the lower the probability of R&D being incurred. This is showing 
us that the fact that there is an identity between ownership and control makes the 
probability of incurring R&D costs decline. As pointed out by Rodríguez (1996), the 
separation between the functions of ownership and management, as well as the 
appearance of widely diffuse ownership structures (the introduction of other businesses 
in the company's shareholding) are phenomena that are easy to prove in the vast 
majority of companies at present (as in the limited company legal status mentioned 
previously). This separation of functions implies a series of advantages, mainly of 
specialisation, which businesses cannot ignore. 
The variable showing ownership concentration (SHARE) is significant and has a 
negative parameter, meaning that the greater the concentration of capital in the hands of 
few people, the lower probability of incurring R&D costs. The relation between the 
ownership concentration and the innovation has been pointed by different authors 
(Galve and Salas, 1993; Leech and Leahy, 1991). We consider that companies in a 
position of effective control (when the largest homogenous group of shareholders 
possesses at least 50% of shares) have a lower probability of carrying out investment in 
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R&D. This is a result that may corroborate some studies for the Spanish case (Andrés et 
al., 2000), which attempts to measure the effect of concentration of ownership of 
Spanish companies on their results. The utilisation of this mechanism seems to act as a 
brake on business growth and in our study, it seems to be also a break for the innovative 
effort. 
The variable for measuring the effect of the financing mechanism in the form of 
debt used to control investment activities carried out by the manager (DEBT) has a 
significant negative parameter, showing that the probability of incurring in R&D costs 
is lower with high debt ratios. Our results are in agreement with the theory, which 
predicts that firms with high debt ratios tend to decrease their R&D expenditures, 
because R&D expenditures can evaporate in financial distress. There are empirical 
evidence that find this negative influence (Hall, 1990; Giudici and Paleari, 2000). 
Among the works dealing with the Spanish situation, that by Azofra et al. (1995) 
obtains a negative relationship between indebtedness and the valuation ratio. It can be 
seen in this study how those companies with intangible assets or good opportunities for 
growth, and as a consequence, higher valuation ratios, tend to resort to debt to a lesser 
extent. It can also be seen how a positive valuation by the market is synonymous with a 
high capacity of internal resources that therefore enables external financing to be 
dispensed with.  
Looking at the variable which states whether or not the company is quoted on the 
Stock Exchange (STOCK), it can be seen that this is not significant in 2001.   
With regard to the variables concerning technological opportunity in the sector, it 
can be seen how those companies with a high technological opportunity (HIGH) have a 
higher probability of carrying out R&D expenses. Many authors have also obtained the 
same conclusions, in the sense that belonging to a business sector with a high level of 
technological complexity is a determinant when innovating (for example, Coronado and 
Acosta, 1999; Gumbau, 1994, 1997; Scherer, 1965; Cohen and Levin, 1989; Paricio, 
1993; Kraft, 1989). 
The variable dealing with the geographical extent of the main market in which the 
company operates (MARKET) shows the effect that the company deciding to expand its 
market to a wider region may have. This variable includes various issues. Firstly, there 
is the fact that companies that are classified in the category of the widest geographical 
extent (Spain and abroad) are in principle larger and more mature companies. This 
variable also shows the effect of demand on the decision to invest in improving the 
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product, so that product innovations are determinant in this situation11. In this field, an 
important role is played by dealing with a wider geographical area. International 
competition is more diverse and more intense than competition in smaller geographical 
areas, meaning that internal capabilities must be improved by more risky advertising or 
innovation expenses in order to obtain a safe market share. We can see that this is a 
significant variable in the year studied, with the estimated parameter positive. This 
result corroborates the one obtained in other studies, such as those by Gumbau (1997), 
Geroski (1990), Dixon and Seddighi (1995), Love et al. (1996) and Mansfield 
(1981,1986). 
Finally, with respect to the technological level of the region (REG), the probability 
of a firm choosing to incur in R&D expenses also seems to increase if the firm is 
situated in a high technological region than if not, as we expected.   
An additional comment in this type of models is their high predictive potential. The 
prediction potential of a model estimated with logistical methodology is carried out by 
means of what is known as "classification table", which compares the observed 
responses with the predicted responses in the implemented model. There is a high 
percentage of correct classification in the estimated models, being close to 74%. 
 
4.2. The R&D effort 
 
Table 6 reports the estimation results for the tobit model, which explains the 
determinants of the innovative effort. The first interesting result is that the significance 
of the variables is equal than the significance of the variables in the probabilistic model 
of R&D input (Model 1). 
As can be deduced from the obtained results, the firm’s size (SIZE) seems to have a 
positive effect on the R&D effort. As size increases, the proportion of R&D 
expenditures per employee increases (Gumbau, 1997; González and Jaumandreu, 1998). 
The age of the firms (AGE) seems to have a positive influence on their innovative 
effort, a results in agreement with some other authors (Busom, 1993; Galende and De la 
Fuente, 2003). 
The results regarding the firm’s ownership structure deserve some additional 
comments. As we obtained in the decision model, the variable showing identity between 
                                                 
11 This aspect is included in the study by González and Jaumandreu (1998), who study the decision to carry out product 
innovations for a sample of Spanish companies. 
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ownership and control (OWN) has a negative and significant parameter, because of the 
reduction of unproductive or inappropriate use of resources, so that the more owners in 
decision positions the less R&D effort. Also, the mechanism of ownership concentration 
(SHARE) and the financing mechanism (DEBT) seems to have the same negative effect 
on the R&D effort. In a work by Myers (1977) the debt ratio seems to be significantly 
and negatively correlated with current R&D expenditures, because of financial distress 
costs, firm with considerable growth opportunities (and, correspondingly, firms that 
have significant R&D opportunities) are unlikely to issue much debt.  However, the 
variable which states whether or not the company is quoted on the Stock Exchange 
(STOCK) seems not to have any effect on the R&D effort per employee. 
In relation with the technological opportunity of the sector of activity, as we 
expected, the two variables have significant parameters. Firms that are belonging to a 
high opportunity sector (HIGH) have more R&D expenditures per employee than 
companies from low or medium opportunity sectors of activity. The results are similar 
to other authors for the Spanish case (Busom, 1993; Gumbau, 1997).  
The variable REG, indicative of the technological opportunity of the region where 
the company is situated, has a positive and significant parameter. Therefore, the location 
of the firm is important for explaining the expense in R&D, explains the importance of 
the region resources in the firm R&D effort. The effect of geographical opportunities in 
Spain has been analysed by González and Jaumandreu (1998) with similar conclusions. 
Finally, the influence of the geographical extent of their main market (MARKET) 
has a positive influence of the innovative effort per employee like in the González and 
Jaumandreu’s work (1998). Companies that have a market higher or equal to national 
have more R&D expenses per employee than companies that have a geographical extent 
lower than national. The conclusion is that competition has a positive effect on the R&D 
firm effort.   
As regards the Mills ratio, it has a positive and significant effect denoting that the 
selectivity bias is relevant so it is determinant to control the different answer between 
the groups of firms (firms that undertaking R&D expenses and firms that do not) as we 
have made in the previous section.  
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4.3. The probability to obtain an R&D output. 
 
Table 7 shows the results of the discrete choice model of R&D output (model 3), 
with quite different conclusions if compared with the results obtained in the R&D input 
models.   
As we expected, the variable that explains de R&D effort per employee (EFFORT) 
has a positive and significant parameter on the probability to obtain an R&D output, a 
result which was obtained by other authors (Love et al, 1996, Beneito, 2003; among 
others). As we expected, the two internal variables that explain the size (SIZE) and the 
age effect (AGE) on the probability of awarding some R&D output are also positive and 
significant, denoting the same conclusions that we obtained in the input model. The 
elder the company is the more probability to obtain R&D output.  
Concerning the mechanisms to alleviate the agency problem, only the variable that 
explains the effect of quoting in the Stock Exchange (STOCK) seems to have a 
significant effect on the probability to award patents or models of use. If a company is 
quoted on the Stock Exchange, the probability to obtain an R&D output is higher than if 
not. This could be related to the idea that the patenting could be used as a signal for the 
shareholders to increase their shares in the company or even for potential shareholders 
to take part on the company. 
Furthermore, the fact that the company has a geographical extent of their market 
(MARKET) higher or equal to the national level seems to have a positive and 
significant effect on the probability to obtain an R&D output. The fact that the market 
size increases the probability of generating innovation a similar result than in Beneito 
(2003). Finally, the effect of the sector of activity (HIGH, LOW) and also the region 
(REG) seems not to be determinant to have an R&D output. This result is contrary to 
the one by Coronado and Acosta (1999), which finds that the probability to obtain a 
R&D output is higher in high technological opportunity sectors of activity. Moreover, 
the Coronado and Acosta work found that if the region where the firm is located is a 
high technological region the firm has a higher probability to innovate.    
In order to evaluate the suitability of the model estimated, we compute a statistic to 
verify the null hypothesis consisting of the coefficients of the variables being equal to 
zero. It shows the difference between the logarithm of likelihood for the full model and 
for the model that only has the constant term. As it can be observed, the log-likelihood 
ratio test produced a χ2  value of 70.299 with 11 degrees of freedom. Its significance (p 
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= 0.0000) indicates that these variables are useful for classifying the firms and the 
model has a high explanatory power. Finally, the predictive efficacy of the model 
presented is measured in the “classification table”. It can be concluded that 93% of the 
firms are correctly classified with the estimated equation.  
 
4.4. The innovative result 
 
Tables 8 and 9 summarise the results of the count data models (model 4) estimated 
by the Poisson and the Negative Binomial methods respectively. The equation explains 
the influence of the variable on the innovative output of the firm. The dependent 
variable of interest is the total number of patents (national and foreigner) and/or models 
of use over the year. In general, the results are encouraging since all the coefficients 
have the expected signs. 
Firstly, the results of the Poisson model (table 8) show that the effect of R&D effort 
(EFFORT) on the R&D output is positive, as we expected. Also, the effect of the 
internal aspects of the firm (size and age) have the expected signs. The size (SIZE) and 
the age (AGE) have significant and positive effect on the achievement of obtaining 
R&D output.   
With regards to the analyses concerning the effect of the control mechanisms on the 
awarded patents in the year several comments are in order. First, there are two 
mechanisms that seem to have some effect on the R&D output: the identity of the 
ownership and management (OWN) and the ownership concentration (SHARE), but the 
effect of the latter is in the opposite direction. Therefore, the results provide evidence 
that ownership concentration has a different effect in their ability to alleviate agency 
costs (and thus reducing R&D expenses) and to improve the innovate results of the 
firms. The identity of the functions of the ownership and management (OWN) has a 
negative effect on the receive patents and/or models of use. However, the ownership 
concentration has a positive effect, since closely-held are more innovative than 
diffusely-held firms. The results provide evidence that ownership concentration 
(SHARE) has a different effect in their ability to alleviate agency costs and to improve 
the innovative results of the firms. The application of this mechanism favours to achieve 
R&D output. This result is found in the empirical literature, which shows favourable 
results when carrying out projects of a high risk nature like the case of the R&D 
activities (Rodríguez, 1996; Galve and Salas, 1993; Leech and Leahy, 1991). Finally, 
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the financing mechanism (DEBT) and the fact that firms are quoted on the Stock 
Exchange (STOCK) seem not to have a significant effect on the R&D output. The fact 
that the financing effect has no significant parameter follows the results obtaining in 
Link (1982), a possible explanation being that R&D activities tend to be financed with 
internal funds.  
As regards the other included variables, the variable that explains the fact of 
pertaining to a innovative region (REG) and having a geographical extent of the main 
market (MARKET) higher or equal than the national level seems to be determinant to 
achieve a good R&D result. 
With regard to the Negative Binomial model results (table 9), we can find that only 
the R&D effort per employee (EFFORT) and the geographical extent of the main 
market (MARKET) have a positive and significant effect on the R&D output of the 
firm. Finally, the coefficient of overdispersion on the Negative binomial model is 
statistically significant showing the adequacy of this type of model. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study has tried to analyse the effect that various questions related with 
ownership structure and control of companies have on their R&D activity. It also comes 
up with conclusions regarding the effect that certain control mechanisms used to 
alleviate possible agency problems arising from the separation between ownership and 
control may have on the R&D firm activities. 
As shown in the data and as noted by various authors (Rodríguez et al., 1994; 
Alonso and Andrés, 2002) the ownership structure of Spanish companies does not meet 
the standards of separation between ownership and control and the existence of a large 
number of small investors, as is the case in the United States. The Spanish case is 
included within the European or continental model, in which the concentration of 
ownership as a mechanism for reducing agency problems predominates. 
In view of the results obtained, we can draw some conclusions regarding the use of 
control mechanisms in resolving agency problems in the administration of business 
decisions. While this type of mechanism leads to the reduction of agency problems in 
moral risk arising in informational asymmetries between administrators and 
shareholders, they may have a number of disadvantages associated with the reduction in 
action on the part of the administrators. 
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With regard to the mechanism based on the concentration of capital in a small 
number of owners, it can be seen that it is the most important mechanisms applied by 
the company. This mechanism has a range of associated disadvantages, related to the 
increased risk borne by the owners (due to the reduction in their number to obtain 
greater control levels), less liquidity in markets and fewer opportunities for negotiation 
of the company's values. As can be seen in our study, it is a mechanism that does not 
favour carrying out investments in innovation, due to the higher levels of supervision of 
administrators' work. However, the application of this mechanism favours to achieve 
R&D output (patents and/or models of use). This result is in agreement with the 
empirical literature which found favourable results when carrying out projects of a high 
risk nature like the case of the R&D activities (Rodríguez, 1996; Galve and Salas, 1993; 
Leech and Leahy, 1991). Greater control over administrators leads to an increase in 
business profitability, since it leads to a behaviour that is closer to the maximisation of 
profits.  
The second control mechanism that the study considers is the effect of the inclusion 
of owners in management and administration tasks. This is a mechanism that aims to 
alleviate the informational asymmetries that may arise due to the separation between 
control and administration, with owners assuming administrators' or managers' decision-
making tasks. This mechanism moves the company away from the benefits of 
specialisation. If we therefore consider the importance of specialisation in the context of 
specific risk of investments in innovation, it can be seen that this mechanism is not the 
most opportune. Specialisation is on many occasions necessary, in order to have 
directors with the ability to administer complex organisational structures, diversify risk 
among shareholders and obtain large volumes of funds to acquire specific assets, as 
noted by Berle and Means (1932). Decreasing the divergences of interests because of an 
increase in the number of owners in management positions will make agency costs 
lower, but risky projects will not be adopted due to the failure to take advantage of 
specialisation or because there is a high degree of concentration of risk in the hands of a 
few owners. As can be seen in our results, an increase in the participation of owners in 
management positions will lower the probability and the intensity both of adopting 
R&D projects and as well as formalising the result of innovation in the Register of 
patents and models of use. 
As regards the third and final mechanism, financing in the form of debt, it can be 
seen that although around half of the company financing is made up of external funding, 
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it is not a significant variable in the achievement to award R&D output, but it seems 
determinant and with negative effect in the probability and intensity to carry out 
investment in R&D. Our result is in agreement with the theories and the empirical 
literature that focus on the influence of debt on the decisions made by managers on the 
investments policy (Myers, 1977; Hall, 1992; among others).  
Finally, with regard to the variables that we introduced in our analysis that show the 
characteristics of the company's internal structure, the anticipated results are obtained. 
The effect of the size, maturity, technological opportunity in the business sector to 
which the company belongs is positively related to the R&D activity, a result in line 
with the literature. Finally, the market structure and geographical variables are 
important in the analysis, with the influence of competition in business decisions related 
to the innovative process especially so. 
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TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Alls sizes 
 
Lab≤200 Lab>200 
Variable 
Min. Max. Mean Median 
Stand. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Mean Median 
Stand. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Mean Median 
Stand. 
Dev. 
Size 3 14419 239.61 51 642.90 3 200 48 29 47 203 14419 692 395 1143 
Age 1 166 24.01 18 20.82 1 161 20 15 17 2 166 34 31 24 
Own 0.00 0.30 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.30 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Share 1.00 100.00 91.43 100.00 21.30 1.00 100.00 93.32 100.00 19.31 2.00 100.00 87.11 100.00 24.78 
Debt 0.00 0.99 0.57 0.58 0.23 0.00 0.99 0.58 0.59 0.23 0.02 0.99 0.54 0.56 0.21 
Effort 0.00 9122.75 186.09 0.00 560.62 0.00 5208.23 95.55 0.00 375.89 0.00 9122.75 388.99 102.45 802.06 
Pat 0 56 0.36 0 2.34 0 25 0 0 1 0 56 1 0 4 
 
TABLE 2. Share of firms undertaking R&D per category 
 
VARIABLE CATEGORIES % 
QUOTED ON THE 
STOCK MARKET 
(STOCK) 
• No 
• Yes 
35.0% 
74.4% 
HIGH LEVEL OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
OPPORTUNITY 
(HIGH) 
• No 
• Yes 
28.5% 
49.2% 
LOW LEVEL OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
OPPORTUNITY 
(LOW) 
• No 
• Yes 
39.6% 
25.1% 
GEOGRAPHICAL 
LIMIT OF THE MAIN 
MARKET 
(MARKET) 
• Lower than National 
• Higher or equal to National 
12.1% 
44.6% 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
LEVEL OF THE REGION 
(REG) 
• High technological region 
• Low technological region 
42.1% 
29.0% 
 
 
TABLE 3. Share of firms awarding Patents and/or Models of use per category 
 
VARIABLE CATEGORIES % 
QUOTED ON THE 
STOCK MARKET 
(STOCK) 
• No 
• Yes 
6.8% 
20.5% 
HIGH LEVEL OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
OPPORTUNITY 
(HIGH) 
• No 
• Yes 
6.4% 
8.4% 
LOW LEVEL OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
OPPORTUNITY 
(LOW) 
• No 
• Yes 
7.5% 
6.2% 
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GEOGRAPHICAL 
LIMIT OF THE MAIN 
MARKET 
(MARKET) 
• Lower than National 
• Higher or equal to National 
2.3% 
8.9% 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
LEVEL OF THE REGION 
(REG) 
• High technological region 
• Low technological region 
9.2% 
5.9% 
 
TABLE  4. Correlation Matrix 
. 
 SIZE AGE OWN STOCK SHARE DEBT HIGH REG MARKET EFFORT PAT 
SIZE 1           
AGE 0.188 1          
OWN -0.176 -0.150 1         
STOCK 0.141 0.142 -0.085 1        
SHARE -0.039 -0.059 0.149 -0.174 1       
DEBT -0.023 -0.256 0.064 -0.075 0.043 1      
HIGH 0.136 0.121 -0.150 0.027 -0.042 0.012 1     
REG 0.099 0.098 -0.034 0.032 -0.034 -0.046 0.045 1    
MARKET 0.166 0.172 -0.203 0.091 -0.095 -0.019 0.119 0.075 1   
EFFORT 0.231 0.147 -0.103 0.067 -0.094 -0.070 0.234 0.049 0.147 1  
PAT 0.179 0.112 -0.050 0.028 -0.018 -0.023 -0.065 -0.046 -0.079 0.030 1 
 
TABLE 5. Model 1: DECISION EQUATION. LOGIT MODEL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VARIABLE ODDS- RATIO COEFFIC. 
STANDARD 
ERROR Z=b/s.e. 
SIZE 1.0023 0.0023 0.0003 7.352*** 
AGE 1.0078 0.0078 0.0033 2.351** 
OWN 0.0008 -7.1745 2.1304 -3.368*** 
STOCK 1.2163 0.1958 0.4482 0.437 
SHARE 0.9908 -0.0092 0.0029 -3.214*** 
DEBT 0.5568 -0.5856 0.3009 -1.946* 
HIGH 1.6183 0.4814 0.1512 3.184*** 
LOW 0.9252 -0.0777 0.1707 -0.456 
REG 1.3016 0.2636 0.1324 1.990** 
MARKET 3.3508 1.2092 0.1802 6.710*** 
Intercept 0.3004 -1.2026 0.3705 -3.246*** 
***significant at the 0.01 confidence level  
** significant at the 0.05 confidence level 
*  significant at the 0.1 confidence level 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Dependent variable: INNOV. Year 2001 
χ2= 404.7566 (0.000) 
R2= 34.2% 
N = 1414 observations 
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TABLE 6. Model 2: EFFORT EQUATION. TOBIT MODEL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Classification Table 
 
Predicted 
 
Undertaking R&D 
 
 
Observed 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Correct 
share 
 
No 
 
782 
 
120 
 
86.7 
 
Undertaking 
R&D Yes 242 270 52.7 
 
Global share 
  
74.4 % 
VARIABLE COEFFIC. STANDARD ERROR Z=b/s.e. 
SIZE 0.2684 0.0441 6.090*** 
AGE 5.1221 1.5749 3.252*** 
OWN -3689.6 1033.6 -3.570*** 
STOCK 108.05 178.59 0.605 
SHARE -5.2875 1.4354 -3.684*** 
DEBT -385.35 157.48 -2.447** 
HIGH 409.92 77.196 5.310*** 
LOW -134.55 91.315 -1.490 
REG 165.20 68.425 2.414** 
MARKET 650.47 93.270 6.974*** 
Intercept -641.29 188.65 -3.399*** 
λ 982.42 32.699 30.044*** 
***significant at the 0.01 confidence level  
** significant at the 0.05 confidence level 
*  significant at the 0.1 confidence level 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Dependent variable: EFFORT (R&D Expenses/ Employment). Year 2001 
Log likelihood function: -4616.510  
N = 1414 observations 
TABLE 7. Model 3: INNOVATE RESULT. LOGIT MODEL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VARIABLE ODDS- RATIO COEFFIC. 
STANDARD 
ERROR Z=b/s.e. 
EFFORT 1.0006 0.0006 0.0001 4.322*** 
SIZE 1.0002 0.0002 0.0001 2.085** 
AGE 1.0088 0.0088 0.0047 1.881** 
OWN 0.0464 -3.0708 3.3806 -0.908 
STOCK 2.2319 0.8028 0.4598 1.746* 
SHARE 1.0024 0.0024 0.0051 0.466 
DEBT 0.9854 -0.0147 0.5161 -0.028 
HIGH 0.7934 -0.2314 0.2652 -0.873 
LOW 0.9976 -0.0023 0.2892 -0.008 
REG 1.0991 0.0945 0.2287 0.413 
MARKET 2.7541 1.0131 0.3670 2.761*** 
Intercept 0.0168 -4.0884 0.6832 -5.984*** 
***significant at the 0.01 confidence level  
** significant at the 0.05 confidence level 
*  significant at the 0.1 confidence level 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Dependent variable: INNOV. Year 2001 
χ2= 68.6856 (0.0000) 
N = 1414 observations 34
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8. Model 4: INNOVATION EQUATION. POISSON MODEL. 
 
Classification Table 
 
Predicted 
 
Awarding R&D output 
 
 
Observed 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Correct 
share 
 
No 
 
1312 
 
3 
 
4.04 
 
Awarding 
R&D output Yes 95 4 99.77 
 
Global share 
  
93.07% 
VARIABLE COEFFIC. STANDARD ERROR Z=b/s.e. 
EFFORT 0.6357E-03 0.2836E-04 22.411*** 
SIZE 0.1461E-03 0.1789E-04 8.165*** 
AGE 0.0116 0.0019 6.177*** 
OWN -6.3877 1.8086 -3.532*** 
STOCK -0.0541 0.2027 -0.267 
SHARE 0.0270 0.0029 9.377*** 
DEBT 0.0564 0.2265 -0.249 
HIGH -0.0063 0.1180 -0.054 
LOW 0.2083 0.1361 1.530 
REG 0.4318 0.1056 4.089*** 
MARKET 1.5650 0.2215 7.066*** 
Intercept -5.8615 0.4067 -14.411*** 
***significant at the 0.01 confidence level  
** significant at the 0.05 confidence level 
*  significant at the 0.1 confidence level 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Dependent variable: PAT. Year 2001 
Log likelihood function: -1353.380 
X2 = 925.3222 (0.0000) 
N = 1414 observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 9. Model 4: INNOVATION EQUATION. NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODEL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VARIABLE COEFFIC. STANDARD ERROR Z=b/s.e. 
EFFORT 0.1282E-02 0.6301E-03 2.035** 
SIZE 0.8634E-03 0.5312E-03 1.625 
AGE 0.0135 0.0148 0.912 
OWN 0.9479 3.1911 0.297 
STOCK -0.2065 1.7556 -0.118 
SHARE 0.0119 0.0124 0.965 
DEBT 0.5547 1.0067 0.551 
HIGH -0.5799 0.5598 -1.036 
LOW 0.2313 0.3997 0.579 
REG 0.2308 0.3783 0.610 
MARKET 1.3423 0.3931 3.415*** 
Intercept -4.9190 1.5974 -3.079*** 
λ 22.7700 3.3140 6.871*** 
***significant at the 0.01 confidence level 
** significant at the 0.05 confidence level 
*  significant at the 0.1 confidence level 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Dependent variable: PAT. Year 2001 
Log likelihood function: -563.2185 
X2 =1580.323 (0.0000) 
N = 1414 observations 35
